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It’s déjà vu all over again:  
Coronavirus, the global energy market, and the Russian economy 
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The impact of the coronavirus pandemic on the global economy has already been 
catastrophic. Whether it will become even more severe is unclear at this point. 
However, most forecasts indicate that the global economy will experience the deepest 
recession in recorded history (IMF, 2020; OECD, 2020). The severity of the contraction 
in economic activity has been especially evident in global energy markets. Demand 
for oil and gas plummeted at a rate never previously observed (IEA, 2020). Electricity 
consumption also declined sharply. All of which presents unprecedented challenges 
for important energy producers. Russia is one such country. It is one of the three 
largest producers of oil, the second largest net exporter of oil, and the largest exporter 
of gas. As a result, coronavirus and the global response to it can be expected to exert 
a profoundly negative influence over the Russian economy.    
 
In this article we present a simple argument. The coronavirus-induced collapse in oil 
prices has once again exposed Russia’s long-standing vulnerability to fluctuations in 
the value of its oil and gas exports. This should not have come as a surprise to 
Russia’s leadership. Structural changes in global energy markets – including the rapid 
growth of renewable forms of energy and the rapid expansion of oil and gas production 
in North America – had already threatened to impose limits on oil and gas revenues 
before the onset of the coronavirus pandemic. Yet Russia’s leaders had failed to take 
the threat posed by the emergence of a ‘new energy order’ seriously (Bradshaw et al. 
2019). Instead, Russia, was, at the beginning of 2020, becoming more dependent on 
oil and gas sales. As a result, the collapse in oil prices that began in March 2020 has 
triggered another severe recession. While Russia appears relatively well placed to 
avoid a worst-case outcome of a fiscal crisis, the options available to the leadership 
for dealing with the recession are limited. In the medium-term, the need to reduce 
Russia’s energy dependency has once again become more urgent. However, 
substantive diversification was not part of the government’s revealed economic 
strategy before the pandemic struck. Whether the destruction of oil demand caused 
by the pandemic will prompt the leadership to change course remains to be seen.  
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To make this argument, the article is organised as follows. In the first section, we 
outline the changes underway in the global energy market before coronavirus that 
were already laying the foundations for a ‘new energy order’. The immediate impact 
of the pandemic on global energy demand suggests that the journey towards this new 
energy order may have been hastened. In the second section, we show how 
dependent Russia’s economy is on the export of oil and gas, and how the Russian 
leadership’s economic strategy had not revealed any serious intent to reduce this 
dependence, leaving it exposed to the collapse in oil prices that took place in March. 
In the final section, we examine the immediate impact of the global recession on 
Russia.  
 
The emergence of a new energy order  
 
 
Even before the price war in March, it was evident that the oil and gas industry faced 
a new energy order (Van de Graff and Bradshaw 2018). This is the result of two 
developments that have gathered pace in recent years.  
 
First, the ‘shale revolution’ in North America has created a more flexible source of oil 
and gas, undermining The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
and their ability to manage production. In 2014-15, Saudi Arabia tried to damage the 
shale industry in the United States (US) by increasing production and driving down the 
oil price. But this strategy ultimately failed as the shale industry reduced its costs and 
was able to recover and secure the finance needed to expand production. In 
September 2016, Russia and Saudi Arabia reached the so-called OPEC+ agreement, 
involving 24 oil-producing countries, to manage oil production to support the price of 
oil. This worked, but it also incentivised the US shale industry to increase production. 
Output surged, reaching record levels in early 2020. The emergence of the US as a 
major exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) has had an equally destabilising impact 
on global gas markets (Bradshaw and Boresma 2020).  
 
Second, following the Paris Agreement in 2015, there has been an increased 
determination to address climate change and accelerate the decarbonisation of the 
global energy system, alongside a desire to reduce urban air pollution. This has been 
aided by the rapid fall in the cost of renewable power generation and a growing 
acceptance of the need to reduce fossil fuel consumption sooner rather than later. In 
this context, the coronavirus pandemic and resulting unprecedented fall in oil and gas 
demand preview an inevitable, more definitive shift that presents an existential threat 
to so-called ‘Producer Economies’ like Russia (IEA 2018, Mitrova et al. 2020).  
 
On the eve of what the IMF (2020) has called the ‘Great Lockdown’, Russia refused 
to accept a request from Saudi Arabia to introduce further production cuts to those 
implemented since the end of 2016. This was surprising given that Russia’s 
participation in the OPEC+ agreement had never actually reduced its oil production to 
any great extent (Krutikhin and Overland, 2020). The real reason for Russia’s 
reluctance to reduce output was revealed by Igor Sechin, the CEO of state-owned oil 
giant, Rosneft (Lisitsnya, 2020). In an interview just after the collapse of the OPEC+ 
agreement in mid-March, Sechin stated that the only beneficiaries of such cuts would 
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be US producers. The immediate result was a sharp fall in global oil prices as Saudi 
Arabia flooded the market in an effort to increase market share and force Russia back 
to the negotiating table. At the same time, the full extent of the impact of the pandemic 
on oil demand became clear. Russia and other members of OPEC+ returned to the 
negotiating table, in part as a result of the intervention of President Trump. In early 
April even more sizeable production cuts were agreed and a subsequent G20 meeting 
resulted in other producing states, including the US, agreeing to cut production further. 
But it all mattered for nought as in April global oil demand fell by 30 per cent and for a 
brief period of time US oil prices were negative.   
 
What happens next is anybody’s guess. There is various talk of a short-sharp ‘V’-
shaped recovery, a ’U’-shaped recovery with a prolonged period of recession, or even 
an ‘L’ shaped depression. One thing is clear, just as in 2008-9, there will be significant 
national variance and, just as in 2008-9, Russia is likely to be hit harder than the global 
average, though less hard than a number of leading Western countries. The reason is 
its reliance on the oil and gas sector. Current views on what happens next in the global 
energy industry seem to be divided into two camps (Mitrova 2020). First, there is the 
oil industry view that the economic recovery will be quick and that prices will rebound 
as demand recovers, albeit delayed due to the large amounts of oil and gas currently 
in storage. Then in a few years’ time, as a result of the substantial cuts in investment 
now, supply will be unable to keep up with demand and prices will spike and all will be 
good again. However, for financial reasons, there is likely to be a permanent reduction 
in US shale production, delivering market share to OPEC+ (Bordorff 2020). Second, 
there is the view of environmental groups, many governments, international 
organisations, and even some oil companies, that calls for a ‘Green Recovery’ with 
stimulus packages with conditions attached to improve energy efficiency and 
accelerate decarbonisation. This, together with permanent changes in consumer 
behaviour, will constrain the recovery of oil demand resulting in an earlier peak in 
global oil demand. 
 
The reality is likely to be a mixture of both of the above: demand will recover, but later 
than expected, and future growth will be constrained more than might otherwise have 
been the case. As a result, prices may indeed spike, but high prices will then 
accelerate further fossil fuel demand destruction. This outcome suggests that there 
may be one further business cycle of high rents left for the producer economies before 
the energy transition results in permanent and accelerating demand destruction and 
the prospect of ‘lower forever’ oil prices that only favour low-cost producers. Where 
future Russian production sits on the cost curve is uncertain, many existing fields are 
in decline, and this may be accelerated by the need to cut production, and greenfield 
developments are likely to be in more costly remote regions and offshore in the Arctic 
(Makarov et al. 2019). In 2017, Russia’s Energy Minister, Alexander Novak estimated 
production cost for Arctic offshore in the range of $70-$100 a barrel, describing them 







Oil and gas exports and the Russian economy 
 
As the world’s second largest net exporter of oil and the largest exporter of natural 
gas, the structural changes in global energy markets described above have potentially 
profound implications for Russia. This is because the value of oil and gas sales, more 
than anything else, shapes the fortunes of the Russian economy. If, as proponents of 
the new energy order thesis suggest, the price of oil and gas is likely to be lower in the 
near future than it has been over the past two decades, Russia will need to look for 
new sources of economic growth. For the Russian leadership, a new energy order 
would represent a severe shock: not only has Russia’s position as an energy 
‘superpower’ served as the primary driver of economic growth at home, but it has also 
been the source of influence and prestige abroad.  
 
The importance of oil and gas exports to the Russian economy   
 
The value of Russian oil and gas exports fluctuated significantly over the past two 
decades (Figure 1). On average, crude oil tends to account for around half of all oil 
and gas exports, with oil products accounting for a further quarter. Natural gas exports 
through pipelines leading to Europe and Turkey account for most of the remainder. 
The share of liquified natural gas (LNG) has risen over the past decade and is 
projected to grow further as more LNG is exported from the giant Yamal LNG facility 





Figure 1. Oil and gas export revenues, 2001-2019 (constant 2015 USD, billion). 
Source: Bank of Russia (2020); authors' calculations. 
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Fluctuations in the value of oil and gas exports affect economic activity in Russia in 
two main ways.  
 
First, oil and gas exports furnish the Russian state with the bulk of its revenues. 
Depending on the total value of oil and gas revenues in a given year, federal 
government income derived from the taxation of the extraction and export of oil and 
gas accounts for between one-third and half of Russia’s federal budget receipts 
(Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, 2020a). As a result, an increase in oil 
and gas revenues tended to be accompanied by an improvement in the federal 
government’s budget balance, and vice versa. To weaken the vulnerability of the fiscal 
position to fluctuations in the price of oil, policymakers put in place a ‘fiscal rule’ 
designed to ensure that tax revenue from oil at prices above $40 per barrel was not 
available for budget expenditure (see Hanson, 2019, p.4).  
 
Movements in the value of oil and gas revenues were also closely correlated with the 
value of the rouble (Pearson’s r = 0.76), exerting a strong influence over Russia’s 
terms of trade (Figure 2). When oil and gas prices rose, Russian citizens and 
businesses were able to buy more goods and services from abroad. But when prices 




Figure 2. Change in value of annual oil and gas export revenues and average 
annual rouble-dollar exchange rate, 2003-2019 (per cent). 








































Annual change in oil and gas revenues (%)
 6 
Second, oil and gas revenues also influence Russian economic performance through 
more indirect means. As described by Gaddy and Ickes (e.g. 2005, 2009, 2013) in 
their schematic account of the relationship between oil and gas revenues and 
economic performance, oil and gas revenues are shared throughout the Russian 
economy via informal revenue sharing mechanisms. These include a mix of direct and 
indirect transfers of oil and gas revenues to other parts of the Russian economy. Direct 
transfers can take the form of, for example, the taxation of oil and gas enterprises and 
then using those revenues to fund military expenditure or social welfare programs. 
Indirect transfers of oil and gas revenues might instead involve oil and gas companies 
supplying inputs to other Russian enterprises at below market price (e.g. supplying 
gas to a power generation firm or households), or by providing demand for goods and 
services produced in the country’s large manufacturing sector.  
 
The links – both formal and informal -- between the oil and gas sector, on the one 
hand, and the rest of the economy, on the other, mean that Russia differs from more 
conventional ‘petrostates’ because of the presence of a large non-hydrocarbon 
sector.1 The problem for Russian policymakers is that while the country maintains a 
large manufacturing sector, a large proportion of it is uncompetitive on global markets 
(hence the low share in Russia’s export basket; see Cooper, 2006; Connolly, 2008, 
2012). This forces firms from within the manufacturing sector to rely on domestic 
demand, which in turn is driven by oil and gas export receipts. 
 
The close relationship between the oil and gas industry and the rest of the economy 
is evident when we examine the correlation between movements in the annual value 
of oil and gas exports and other key economic variables. Between 2001 and 2019, the 
statistical correlation between annual movements in the value of oil and gas exports, 
and with GDP (Pearson’s r = 0.77), fixed investment (r = 0.75), and retail sales (r = 




Figure 3. Annual changes in oil and gas revenues and selected indicators of 
Russian economic performance, 2001-2019 (per cent).  
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Source: Bank of Russia (2020); Federal State Statistics Service (2020); authors' 
calculations. 
 
Because the wider economy is so dependent on the redistribution of oil and gas 
revenues, Russia has proven susceptible to any significant fluctuations in the price of 
oil (Connolly, 2018). It is instructive that the last three recessions in Russia—1998, 
2008-2009, and 2014-2015—were all triggered by sharp declines in the price of oil. As 
shown in Figure 4, annual changes in oil and gas revenues have served as an 
excellent predictor of Russian economic performance.  
 
However, this relationship has weakened somewhat in recent years due to the Central 
Bank’s shift towards an inflation targeting strategy at the end of 2014. As shown in the 
top right quadrant, annual growth in oil and gas revenues of 39 per cent caused GDP 
to grow by 5.2 per cent; by 2018, the same oil and gas export growth was accompanied 
by much weaker growth of 2.5 per cent. But this weakening of the relationship works 
both ways. As shown in the bottom left quadrant, the 2009 collapse in oil and gas 
revenues (a decline of 39 per cent) caused GDP to decline by 7.8 per cent. But in 
2015 a same proportionate reduction in oil and gas revenues was accompanied by a 
much shallower recession. Nevertheless, while the strength of the relationship has 
weakened over time, it remains the case that oil and gas exports revenues are the 
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Figure 4. Annual changes in oil and gas revenues and GDP, 2001-2019 (per cent).  
 





Industrial policies to foster diversification: plus ça change 
 
Policymakers in Russia have not been oblivious to the need to generate new economic 
capabilities outside the oil and gas sector. Since 2000, several government initiatives 
have attempted to nurture sectors of the economy located outside the oil and gas 
industry (e.g. Ministry of Economic Development, 2012; Connolly, 2013; President of 
Russia, 2018)).2 However, these policies have met with only modest success, largely 
because those initiatives were either not afforded sufficient financial or institutional 
support to make a real difference, or because the prevailing system of political 
economy prevented the emergence of new economic actors (Connolly, 2013; 
Kuznetsov and Simachev, 2014).  
 
To the extent that industrial policies have been implemented with any consistency, 
they have tended to perpetuate the existing production structure. Since 2014, officials 
have, for example, extolled the virtues of Russia’s import substitution 
(importozameshchenie) programme. This was designed to expand investment and 
production in areas of Russian manufacturing (Connolly and Hanson, 2016). However, 
the rate of annual investment in the Russian hydrocarbons industry rose faster than 
aggregate investment in all but one year since 2014 (Figure 5). All things being equal, 
this should perpetuate, not weaken, the role played by the oil and gas industry in 
Russia’s economy in the future.  
 
This should not have been a source of surprise to observers. Statements from Russian 
officials consistently signalled the desire to expand production of oil and gas. New 
deals to export oil and gas to China and Turkey were finalised. Russia’s draft energy 
strategy, written in 2014 and, after some amendments, approved in April 2020, 
stressed the need to expand the export of hydrocarbons to rapidly-growing markets 
outside Europe, with the aim of maintaining Russia’s position as one of the world’s 
top-three hydrocarbon exporting countries (Ministry of Energy of the Russian 




Figure 5. Annual rate of growth in fixed investment in the Russian hydrocarbons 
sector, 2010-2019 (per cent annual change in value of investment).  
 
Source: Federal State Statistics Service (2020); authors' calculations. 
 
Moreover, even those policies designed to foster manufacturing capabilities outside 
the oil and gas industry remain dependent on the existence of a thriving hydrocarbons 
sector. For instance, twelve of the nineteen non-military areas of the economy 
identified by the government’s import substitution strategy of 2015 were located in the 
oil and gas extraction equipment industry. Elsewhere, policies to support the 
development of a large new ship-building facility at the Zvezda complex in Russia’s 
Far East, are based on supplying ships and marine equipment to facilitate off-shore 
oil and gas extraction in the Arctic.3 Put simply, Russia’s industrial policies seem 
designed to strengthen the role played by the oil and gas sector rather than weaken 
it.  
 
An energy strategy for the future (or the past)?   
 
Despite persistent official rhetoric about the desirability of diversification and 
modernisation, it is clear that only modest progress was made in developing new 
industries. With the exception of the sustained growth in agricultural production and 
exports, Russia’s production looked much like it did in 2000 (Wegren, 2020). 
Meanwhile, as the leaders of other hydrocarbon-exporting countries like Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates at least acknowledged the importance of preparing for 
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a post-hydrocarbon future, official Russian energy strategies continued to emphasise 
the importance of increasing production and export of oil and gas (Ministry of Energy, 
2020). 
 
The Energy Strategy to 2035, approved in April 2020, provides a clear insight into the 
role Russian officials envisage that Russia will play in global energy markets in the 
future (Ministry of Energy, 2020).4 The document reveals that the Russian leadership 
is aiming to “strengthen and maintain” the country’s position as one of the leading 
energy powers in the world (ibid. p.6). This, it is stated, will enhance Russia’s 
economic security, promote socio-economic development, and strengthen the 
country’s position on the international stage (ibid. p. 12).   
 
To be sure, there is an acknowledgment that the global energy environment is shifting. 
The challenge of climate change and the growth of renewable forms of energy are 
both cited as important “challenges and threats” to Russia’s energy strategy (ibid. 
pp.12-13). As is the growth of oil and gas production in North America, which it is 
acknowledged, may result in a lower price for hydrocarbons in the future (ibid. p.13). 
Due to the document only recently being approved, it even mentions the “coronavirus 
pandemic” as a threat (ibid. p.28). However, rather than suggest that these trends 
might obviate the need for Russia to produce and export large volumes of oil and gas, 
the document lays out a vision of Russia bolstering its position in precisely those 
product markets.    
 
In the oil industry, the strategy forecasts a gradual reduction in the global demand. 
This, however, is seen to take place alongside a tightening of global supply, especially 
as the most readily accessible reserves are exhausted (ibid. p.28). Growth in China 
and India is viewed as likely to see demand for certain sub-types of oil rise. As a result, 
a “new price growth cycle” is envisaged (ibid). Robust global growth in demand for gas 
is also forecast, largely due to the need for countries to shift away from coal-based 
power generation to reduce carbon emissions (ibid. p.29). But coal consumption, it is 
suggested, will not disappear; instead, it will remain the primary source of energy in 
the “developing countries” of the Asia-Pacific and Africa.  
 
Perhaps the key point in the document is the view that any significant switch towards 
renewables is only likely to take place in high-income OECD countries. By contrast, 
the consumption of large volumes of coal, alongside growth in demand for oil, is seen 
as likely to continue in the Asia-Pacific region and to grow in Africa. Russia, it is stated, 
should aim to exploit these sources of demand growth. As a result, an ambitious target 
of ensuring that energy exports to Asia will form at least half of all Russian energy 
exports by 2035 is set (ibid. p.72). It is also argued that Russia should not simply 
provide energy: it should also seek to supply technologies to facilitate energy 
extraction in Russia and abroad (ibid. pp.61-64).     
 
Even a cursory examination of the strategy reveals that Russia’s leadership has made 
a very clear bet that hydrocarbons will continue to play the most important role in global 
energy markets for years to come. The shift towards greater use of renewables and 
other low-carbon sources of energy will, it is suggested, be largely confined to high-
income OECD economies. But robust growth in demand for hydrocarbons will 
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continue to take place in the majority of low- and middle-income countries outside 
North America and Europe. The strategy is designed to help Russia to meet this 
demand.   
 
The stakes in such a gambit were always high. If the forecast contained in the strategy 
were to prove accurate, Russia would be well-placed to occupy a strong position in 
the supply of strategically-important energy to the rapidly-growing markets of what 
Oliver Stunkel (2016) refers to as the ‘non-West’. While this might confound 
mainstream Western opinion, it would enable Russia’s leadership to maintain the 
existing system of political economy – based as it is on the state-directed redistribution 
of oil and gas revenues – largely in its current form.  
 
However, by elevating the role that hydrocarbon export play in the economy even 
further, there always remained a high probability that Russia’s well-established 
‘addiction’ and concomitant vulnerability to fluctuations in oil prices would be exposed 
again in the future. This vulnerability was, in rather predictable fashion, exposed once 
again even before the ink was dry on the president’s signature that approved the 
Energy Strategy to 2035.   
 
 
Coronavirus and the Russian economy 
 
A rapidly changing situation 
 
The coronavirus pandemic and the oil-price crash upset plans around the world. The 
plans of the Russian leadership suffered along with others. The federal budget plan 
approved in October 2019 was based on what seemed at the time a plausible set of 
baseline assumptions about oil prices and the rouble-dollar exchange rate in 2020-
22, together with a rather less plausible projection of accelerating GDP growth.  
 
Table 1. Baseline assumptions for the Russian federal budget plan, 2020-22, annual 
averages and year-on-year % change  
 




GDP % change 
Year on Year 
2020 57 65.7 1.7 
2021 56 66.1 3.1 
2022 55 66.5 3.2 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. (Minfin 2020c)r 
 
Oil and gas revenues for the federal budget were planned at about R7.5trn, 
equivalent to 6.6% of GDP (ibid.) and to $113.7bn at the projected exchange rate. 
The break-even oil price for the 2020 budget was $42.45 p/b. 
 
As the oil price and the rouble fell, analysts and policymakers struggled to keep up. 
 On March 12 Audit Chamber head Aleksey Kudrin was quoted as saying that if the 
average oil price in 2020 was $35/b and the rouble averaged 72 to the dollar, the 
loss of oil and gas revenue to the budget would be R3trn. There would be a federal-
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budget deficit of 2% of GDP and the economy would flatline (Kudrin 2020) Six days 
later the Brent oil price fell to just under $25/b. (Business Insider 2020) 
 
By mid-April a group of liberal Russian economists put forward three scenarios for 
2020. 
• Optimistic: average Urals oil price $40/b, GDP change -3.7% 
• Moderate: average Urals oil price $31/b, GDP change -5.7% 
• Pessimistic: average Urals oil price $24/b. GDP change -7.9% 
In each scenario the fall in GDP was steeper for Russia than for the world as a 
whole. (Liberal’naya missiya 2020) 
 
At the end of April, the business newspaper RBK offered an estimate of the fall in 
GDP in 2020 caused by the pandemic and the oil-price crash: 7%. This was 
associated with a loss to the federal budget of 6.5% of GDP, made up of the stimulus 
package, put at 2.8% of GDP by Siluanov, and revenue losses of 3.7% of GDP (RBK 
2020b). 
 
The Central Bank of Russia published in April a baseline scenario for 2020-22 that 
showed how far some official thinking had moved. 
 
Table 2.  Central Bank of Russia baseline scenario for 2020-22, average Urals oil 
price ($/b) and GDP (% change Year on Year) 
 
Year Oil price GDP 
2020 27 -4 to -6 
2021  35 2.8 to 4.8 
2022 45 1.5 to 3.5 
 
Source: Central Bank of Russia (Bank of Russia 2020b) 
 
This forecast is based on a fundamental assumption that might be said to be 
optimistic. It is one that most policymakers around the world are currently making: 
that the pandemic recedes in the latter part of 2020 and recovery follows. More 
specific to Russian circumstances is the wide range of the CBR’s future GDP 
estimates. This, we suggest, reflects political sensitivity. The upper end of the range 
for 2021 and 2022 is a bow to Putin’s ambitions. The lower end dispenses with those 
ambitions. 
 
The Ministry of Finance (MinFin) early May assessment of the new budgetary 
situation in 2020 was that the Urals oil price would average $30/b; the federal budget 
would be R1.5trn down on oil-and-gas revenues and R2trn down on non-oil-and-gas 
revenues (reflecting the general decline in global demand and pandemic-constrained 
supply); and a budget deficit of 4% of GDP would be covered by transfers from the 







The policy response 
 
How have the Russian authorities tried to tackle the economic crisis so far? Two 
elements in the response stand out. The state resources committed to stimulating 
the economy have been relatively small; and Putin has not taken the lead in setting 
out measures to counter the pandemic.  
 
Finance Minister Siluanov in late April said the support package amounted to 2.8% 
of GDP This the RBK newspaper reckoned was about R2.9trn.(RBK 2020) The 
addition of a third package of measures in early May brought the total to R3.7trn and 
3.3% of GDP. (Third Package 2020) As a percentage of GDP this is still modest by 
the standards of most OECD countries. How much of it is a direct call on the federal 
and regional budgets is not clear. There are quite a lot of state loan guarantees and 
tax deferrals in the mix of measures, and it is far from clear how these have been 
quantified. Another part of the package consists of measures to soften regulations 
affecting business, including the inspections regime and the terms and conditions of 
state purchase contracts, (Government of the Russian Federation 2020) These do 
not directly involve expenditure but are probably of real assistance to business. 
 
The IMF provides a summary of national anti-crisis measures but does not attempt to 
quantify them (IMF 2020).  Russian Forbes has a useful summary of the ingredients 
of the second package of measures, which stresses that much more in this package 
is going to big business than to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), but the 
second package is of course only part of the picture. (Milyukova and Petukhova 
2020).  There is however a Russian government posting that purports to be 
comprehensive. 
 
Table 3. Selected components of the Russian government anti-crisis support 
package as of April 20, 2020 
  
 Value (R bn) 
Credit subsidies, general   330 
Support for SMEs 488 (includes tax postponements, social        
insurance cut, credit subsidies) 
Support for tourism, hotels, airlines 37 
Pharma, medical supplies 15 
System-forming enterprises Not quantified 
Loan support for regions 270 
Support for personal incomes 164 (includes enhanced payments to 
veterans, maternal capital, not including 
wage subsidies to companies) 
Total 1304 
      
Source: Plan for overcoming the economic consequences of COVID-19 
(Government of the Russian Federation 2020) 
 
If the total package at the time was, as RBK guesstimated, about R2.9trn, the larger 
part of the package is not quantified in the ‘Plan’ document. The overall position can 
however be assessed in broad terms from government statements and public 
commentary: the support package is modest; its burden on the federal budget is 
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even more modest; support is concentrated on big business in the form of an 
expanding contingent of 1000+ ‘system-forming enterprises’, in which state firms and 
large private firms with strong political connections are the main beneficiaries; but 
SMEs are perhaps not as neglected as some commentary would have it. Support for 
personal incomes is predominantly indirect: subsidies to companies that are 
conditional on very low redundancies. In addition, private firms are under pressure, 
in the Russian manner, to contribute to local social provision. 
 
Russian policy in the current crisis is constrained by the leadership’s preoccupation 
with economic security. Government borrowing on any substantial scale would entail 
borrowing from abroad. On the face of it, in light of Russia’s low ratio of debt to GDP, 
this should not be a problem. But it is judged by Russian policymakers not to be 
possible because of sanctions. Even if it were possible, it would not in their view be 
desirable. It would open Moscow to leverage from a hostile outside world. Therefore, 
the support package has to be modest.  
 
There may be additional, more narrowly economic, considerations. Vladimir Mau 
argues that Western countries at present are not vulnerable to inflation. Accordingly, 
in a low-interest environment they can ramp up borrowing without fear of the crisis 
leading to stagflation. Russia is not so fortunate: stagflation remains, for Moscow, a 
threat (presumably because rouble devaluation, linked to a falling oil price, puts up 
domestic prices and because inflation expectations are volatile). For this reason, 
Russian macro-economic policy has to stay cautious; no helicopter money for 
Moscow (Butrin, 2020).  Whatever the merits of this argument, the preoccupation 
with security is a sufficient explanation of the small size of the support package. 
 
Policymaking in the crisis 
 
As long as the current elite perception of economic security dominates policy, it will 
dictate a financially cautious approach. That approach is associated with Finance 
Minister Siluanov and Central Bank governor Nabiullina – though their espousal of 
financial prudence no doubt has its basis in economic orthodoxy as well as security 
concerns. A modest – perhaps dangerously over-modest – stimulus package looks 
to be firmly in place. 
 
For the time being, at least, Russian finances are strong. At $567bn on May 1 (33% 
of 2019 GDP), its international reserves comfortably exceed gross external debt 
(Bank of Russia, 2020). The National Welfare Fund (NWF), now in use as a 
budgetary reserve fund, totalled $165bn, equivalent to 11.3% of GDP, on April 1, 
2020 (Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, 2020b). Most of the NWF is 
available to finance a federal-budget deficit. Four years, approximately, of budget 
deficits at 2% of GDP could be financed in this way alone, without any recourse to 
borrowing. Hence the official confidence that Moscow can cope with even a long-
drawn-out crisis. 
 
In other respects, Moscow’s handling of the pandemic and the oil-market crash was 
confused. The decision to abandon the first OPEC+ agreement in early March 
appeared rash at the time and even more so in retrospect. As noted earlier, it was 
reported that the driving force behind the decision was the CEO of state-owned 
Rosneft, Igor Sechin (Lisitsnya, 2020). However, Russia was forced back to the 
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negotiating table within a matter of weeks after prices collapsed even more 
precipitously than its leadership presumably expected. This volte face hinted at a 
deeper incoherence in the policy process and the absence of a clear strategy.  
 
Since then, Putin has made several public addresses on the crisis but has not taken 
a lead in handling the pandemic. The Mayor of Moscow, Sergei Sobianin, led the 
campaign for self-isolation and business shutdowns (Galeotti, 2020). By and large, 
Putin has left the management of the pandemic to regional leaders like Sobianin. 
Meanwhile he has rejected calls from conservatives to declare a state of emergency, 
Siluanov, Nabiullina and Sobianin belong to that segment of the Russian elite that 
Tatiana Stanovaya (2020) classifies as ‘political technocrats’. These are influential 
people on whom Putin relies for running the country. Stanovaya sees a tendency 
towards conflict between technocrats and conservatives. Like several other 
commentators, she also sees growing problems in the management of the current 
crisis. ‘In the long run, a lack of effective governance at a time of national peril could 
hasten the gradual formation of an elite not beholden to Putin’.  
 
The duration of the coronavirus pandemic is unknown. If the pandemic does not 
recede in the latter part of 2020, or if it recedes but the retreat is followed by a 
second peak, Russian society and the Russian economy will be in deep trouble. But 
so will the rest of the world. 
 
The future evolution of global demand for oil and gas is open to a wide range of 
predictions. None of them is encouraging for Moscow in the long term. If Russian 
policy-makers are using the crisis to prepare for a new energy order, they are not 
telling anyone about it. Official projections assume that oil and gas will continue to be 




In just a few months, the coronavirus pandemic disrupted large swathes of the global 
economy. It is highly likely that further disruption lies ahead. This has already 
threatened the growth models of major oil and gas producer countries, like Russia. As 
we have argued, the collapse in oil prices triggered by the coronavirus pandemic once 
again exposed Russia’s enduring susceptibility to sharp falls in oil and gas prices. 
Tectonic shifts in global energy markets – including the rapid growth of renewable 
forms of energy and the rapid expansion of oil and gas production in North America – 
which had already threatened to reduce the value of future oil and gas revenues. 
These tendencies were accelerated by the collapse in demand caused by the 
pandemic.  
 
Once again, Russia was hit hard by a fall in oil prices. Its leadership had failed to take 
the threat posed by the emergence of a new energy order seriously. Instead of 
diversifying its production and export structure to insulate the economy from 
fluctuations in commodity prices, Russia remained, at the beginning of 2020, highly 
dependent on oil and gas sales as the primary source of economic growth. To be sure, 
the measures undertaken since 2014 to reduce the government’s fiscal dependence 
on high oil prices will help Russia avoid a worst-case outcome of a fiscal or financial 
crisis. However, the dependence of other sectors on the energy sector remained high. 
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This left Russia set once again to experience a deeper recession than that forecast 
for other energy exporting economies.   
 
Predicting the precise impact that this latest slump in oil prices will have on Russia is, 
of course, impossible. Nevertheless, it is possible to highlight several dynamics that 
might be disrupted by the sharp reduction in oil and gas revenues that have 
accompanied the pandemic.  
 
First, a decline in the volume of financial resources available to sustain Russia’s 
revenue distribution system could expose fissures within the ruling elite. Years of 
relatively high oil prices caused the number of claimants on the revenue flows that 
sustain Russia’s rent sharing system to rise. If, as is likely, resources become scarcer, 
it is possible that intra-elite conflict will rise as different constituencies fight to preserve 
their access to resource revenue flows.  
 
Second, there is the effect on relations between the centre and the regions. In the 
course of the crisis, as noted above, much of the responsibility for handling the 
pandemic has been devolved de facto to the regions. This has exacerbated the old 
problem of unfunded mandates at regional level: the lack of resources at the disposal 
of most regional authorities to fulfil the tasks assigned to them. As available resources 
shrink and the support package remains modest, most Russian regions will be even 
more short of funds than usual. Inequalities among regions are likely to worsen.  
 
The devolution of decision-making on lockdowns has two kinds of logic: it reflects the 
vast diversity of Russia’s regions, and it may perhaps allow Putin to evade blame for 
mistakes. The first of these has some force. The second is a gamble that may not pay 
off. 
 
Third, any prolonged slump in oil and gas revenues could threaten the social contract 
that has served as the foundation of Vladimir Putin’s power since he came to power 
in 1999. While much attention is paid to the distribution of resource rents amongst elite 
constituencies, it is also the case that many ordinary Russians have benefited from 
the rent distribution system in the form of employment, social benefits, and rising living 
standards (Miller, 2018). If this latest slump reduces the prospect of living standards 
rising in the future, the sustainability of the prevailing system of political economy might 
be compromised.  
 
The options available to the leadership for igniting a diversification programme are 
likely to be limited. However, failure to take serious action could be disastrous. The 
former prime minister and architect of economic reform in Russia in the 1990s, Yegor 
Gaidar, wrote in 2006 about the dangers of overdependence on natural resource 
revenues (Gaidar, 2006). Seeking to explain the sudden, and, for most, unexpected 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Gaidar highlighted how a growing dependence on oil and 
gas exports in the 1970s and early 1980s led to the Soviet Union developing an 
“ineffective but stable” political and economic system (ibid. p.131). This stability, 
however, proved illusory as a slump in oil and gas exports exposed the weaknesses 
of the system and ultimately led to its collapse. Many observers today might apply the 
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epithet of “ineffective but stable” to Russia’s political economy today. A failure to adjust 
to the emergence of the new energy order, hastened by the coronavirus pandemic,  





1 For more on the relationship between oil prices and growth, see Tabata (2006). 
2 The latter are discussed in Hanson (2019).  
3 The Zvezda complex is discussed in Connolly (2018, pp.98-100). 
4 The document is discussed in detail in Mitrova and Yermakov (2019). 
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